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Abstract. Starting from 2019, the annual elections of the GI (German Society
for Computer Scientists) will be carried out using a new online voting system
developed by POLYAS, aiming at providing high, state-of-the-art security guaran-
tees. We describe the steps that POLYAS plans to take together with the GI and
academic partners in order to achieve the level of transparency and trust that is
expected from modern online voting. The participation of the academic partners
is the key factor to make the verification process both practical and meaningful.
Online voting has been used by the GI — German Society for Computer Scientists
(Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.) — for its annual elections since 2004. These elections
have been so far carried out using the POLYAS 2.3 voting system. Starting from 2019,
the GI elections will be carried out using the new POLYAS online voting system, POLYAS
3.0, based on currently available cryptographic methods.
The current state of the e-voting research offers variety of techniques that address
the fundamental security concerns of e-voting: privacy and end-to-end verifiability.
However, to fully utilize the potential of those methods, one has to take into account
some practical aspects and challenges, such as usability and constraints imposed by the
organisation which carries out the elections. Also, as commonly agreed, the desired de-
gree of confidence and trust cannot be achieved without a high level of transparency
and without participation of independent experts. In this paper, we discuss the steps
already taken and those planned by POLYAS, the GI, and the academic partners, which
are designed to result in an election process which satisfies the pragmatics of the GI
elections and, at the same time, provides practical and meaningful security guarantees.
Independent verification tools. POLYAS 3.0 implements standard mechanisms aiming
at providing universal verifiability: all the important steps of the tallying process (such
as shuffling and decryption) produce appropriate zero-knowledge proofs. It is then, in
principle, possible for everyone to check those zero knowledge proofs in order to make
sure that the tallying process has been carried out correctly. However, in order to uti-
lize this ability in a practical and meaningful way, we have established a cooperation
including academic partners in order to build independent verification tools. The de-
tailed documentation of the tallying process, based on which verification tools can be
implemented, has been provided by POLYAS to the GI and to the academic partners for
review. POLYAS has also provided a reference implementation of the verification proce-
dure. Both the documentation and the reference implementation will be made publicly
available. As of now, one independent implementation of the verification procedure has
already been built by Maximilian Noppel from KIT and implementation of two other
verification tools have been started in the group of Prof. Küsters from University of
Stuttgart, one of which is being funded by POLYAS.
In the election process, an auditor will have an option to choose (one or more of)
the verification tools in order to verify the final election data. We have already used the
two existing verification tools to verify the tallying process of a test election carried out
in July 2019.
Generation of voters credentials and formal verification of some security goals.
In order to establish a mechanism preventing ballot stuffing (or to provide, so-called,
eligibility verifiability), the process of generating voters’ private credentials (used to
digitally sign the ballots) is be carried out in a controlled way by an entity designated
by the Election Council (GI). Consequently, POLYAS does not know the voters’ private
credential upfront. The specification of this process, as well as the source code of the
credential generation tool has been provided by POLYAS (with the option to build inde-
pendent implementations in the future). The process of credential generation (carried
out by GI using the provided tool) has been part of the mentioned above test election.
We plan to make both the specification of this process and the source code of the corre-
sponding tool publicly available.
The central security goals of the credential generation tool is that the randomly gen-
erated plaintext passwords are only saved in an encrypted file designated for the trusted
distribution facility and they do not leak in any other way (in particular, they should
not make it to the file designated for POLYAS which should only contain the corre-
sponding derived public credentials). We plan to use program verification methods to
formally prove this property on the implementation level. In this non-trivial task, which
has already been started by Michael Kirsten from the group of Prof. Bernhard Beckert
(KIT), the KeY tool will be used in combination with techniques from simulation-based
security.
Individual verifiability. The known solutions for individual verifiability involve several
trade-offs, including the usability aspect: the voters should understand the process and
be able to carry out the prescribed steps. Moreover, the election council must establish
well define procedures for handling voters’ complaints. We plan to address this security
requirements in the second step, that is in the GI Elections 2020. The solution which
POLYAS offers is based on the optional use of a second device (such as a mobile phone)
by the voter. The details of this process are being still discussed.
The goal of our cooperation between POLYAS and the academic partners described
above is to make the election process offered by POLYAS transparent and auditable in a
practical and meaningful way. We believe that opening this process is the best way to
build up trust and to improve the offered e-voting solutions.
